Economics Webinar: Virtue of Simplicity in Asymmetric Auctions | Shiv Nadar University
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Economics Webinar: Virtue of Simplicity in Asymmetric Auctions

Event Date: 
Friday, October 29, 2021 -

The Department of Economics invites you to a webinar titled 'Virtue of Simplicity in Asymmetric Auctions' by Dr. Swagata Bhattacharjee, Assistant Professor, Ashoka University on 29 October 2021 at 3:30 PM (IST).

In single object auctions when bidders are asymmetric, the Myerson Optimal auction is difficult to implement because of its informational requirements, its complexity, and a possible discouragement effect on the bidders. Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) proposes a ëSimpleíauction that generates at least half the revenue compared to Optimal auction. This paper experimentally studies the performance of Simple auction vis-a-vis Optimal auction in terms of revenue generation. We find that Simple auction revenue approximates Optimal version much better than what the theory predicts. We explore the bidding behavior and show that the high type bidders get discouraged by the disfavoring rules of Optimal auction. We also explore the role of cognitive ability in bidding behavior.

Friday 29, Oct 2021
03:30 PM - 05:00 PM