Why India must rethink its Tibet policy

The July 2 announcement by the 14th Dalai Lama stating that the traditional process of his reincarnation will continue is an occasion to examine Indian and Chinese responses, the reasons for the Dalai Lama’s decision and to ask the question of what Indian policy going ahead should be.

Now that the Dalai Lama has made his position clear, what is the best possible outcome for India? That the next Dalai Lama is born in India? That the next Dalai Lama is not born in India and, therefore, does not complicate its ties with China? Or, that there will be two Dalai Lamas, leaving open the option of another “Tibet card” for India to use in the future?

The fact that there has never been and continues to be no answer from the Indian government to these questions and that speculation and talk of moral obligations take the place of policy is perhaps the sum and substance of India’s Tibet card today.

Central and state ministers did claim China had no business interfering in the Dalai Lama’s succession. The Dalai Lama’s birthday celebrations saw Indian ministers in attendance and the Prime Minister tweet his birthday greetings. These actions are certainly examples of India’s assertiveness vis-à-vis China but they are also episodic in nature – there is no guarantee that they constitute consistent policy or will be replicated.

Consider the contrast with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs statement on July 4. In the typically terse manner it reserves for matters Chinese, the Ministry merely declared that “Government of India does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion”.

The day after the Prime Minister’s tweet, the Chinese responded by urging India to be “fully cognisant of the sensitivity of issues related to [Tibet]”, and to “act prudently”. In a statement released the same day as the announcement in Dharamshala, China announced that at the end of 2024, the number of Tibetan members in the Communist Party of China’s branch in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) stood at over 375,000. This figure is 2.5 times larger than the Tibetan exile population. This numbers game also informs another public statement that draws on historical, legal and religious arguments – even if specious ones – to explain why the “reincarnation of Living Buddhas must follow the principle of respecting the sentiments of lay followers… within China, rather than in places where Tibetan Buddhism is not traditionally practised”.

It might be easy to dismiss such a statement as hypocritical but given China’s economic and media resources, its narrative will dominate in many parts of the world, including in India’s immediate neighbourhood.

It is important to understand that the Dalai Lama’s decision to stick to the traditional way of reincarnation instead of some of the innovative alternatives he had been suggesting for years means that Chinese pressure has worked. Externally, this pressure involved a decades-long high-decibel campaign around the world to delegitimise the Tibetan leader and to force countries to count the economic costs of opposing China on the issue.

Internally, despite the Communist Party’s questionable historical claim over Tibet and its fragile legitimacy among Tibetan population, it has entrenched itself deeply in Tibetan society with heavy investment in internal security and control over religious institutions. It has effectively remade the political-administrative system with more Han Chinese and a new generation of “sinicised Tibetan leaders” at the helm of affairs.

While the Dalai Lama has entrusted the Gaden Phodrang Trust with the task of identifying the next reincarnation, a traditional process is one that is weighted against the Tibetan exile community – not only will it take several years to find the next reincarnation, it will also take a decade and more or possibly decades after the discovery for the next Dalai Lama, if he is born outside China, to find his feet and global acceptance, if at all.

What must India do?

Given the zero-sum approach of the Chinese Party-state, there is no point to New Delhi constraining itself on issues related to Tibet or its borders. Clarity of communication with Beijing about Indian interests is essential. The most important step India must take is to acknowledge and state explicitly that what happens in the wider Tibetan region, including TAR, affects India too.

First, Tibetan Buddhism has adherents in India’s border communities and access to the Kailash Manasarovar is important for its Hindus. India also cannot simply fall in with Chinese claims that Tibet was historically part of China. Historical and cultural linkages, therefore, have their place in international politics and those with Tibet need to be seen not through the lens only of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan exile community but India’s own interests.

Second, Tibet is important to India because of a live boundary dispute with China. It is China’s insecurities inside Tibet (and Xinjiang) and its refusal to understand that India has no territorial ambitions over these regions that have led to the persistence of the dispute. As long as these insecurities continue, the dispute, too, will continue. Neither idealistic notions of Tibet as a zone of peace nor plans for trade and connectivity across the Himalayan gap can be entertained.

The Dalai Lama might have done India a favour by choosing a traditional reincarnation process. His decision sets aside for the foreseeable future any real influence that the institution can exercise on India-China relations. This should encourage New Delhi to clarify its policies towards China.

 

Originally Published as Jabin T. Jacob and Devendra Kumar. 2025. ‘Why India must rethink its Tibet policy’. The Indian Express. 6 August.