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6 August 2024

The ‘Third Polarity’ in Sino-Tibetan Negotiations



It was an interesting coincidence that the book—Imperial Games in Tibet—by former Indian diplomat Dilip Sinha appeared on the market at the time the bipartisan Resolve Tibet Bill, titled Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act, was signed into an Act by the US President.

Sinha previously served as the head of the United Nations delegation at a time when India had a seat in the Security Council. He was also posted as Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, when India was elected Vice President of the Human Rights Council and Vice Chairman of the South Centre.

Though never posted in China, his diplomatic experience gave him the background to study the ‘Great Game’ over Tibet. He soon realised the deep injustice inflicted on the Dalai Lama and his people, especially after the Lhasa government took Tibet’s plight to the UN in November 1950.

After delving deep into old records, Sinha concluded: “Tibet’s current plight is the result of a combination of miscalculation and misfortune. Its misfortune was that Britain and Russia left it in the Chinese empire, refusing to support its bid for independence even after the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. Had either of them annexed it at that time or earlier, Tibet would be a free country today. Instead, neither supported Tibet’s appeal to the UN, leaving it to India and the US. The absence of international support left Tibet at China’s mercy.”

The Resolve Tibet Bill

On 15 February 2024, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted for the bipartisan Resolve Tibet Bill. The House’s approval of the bill seemed a major achievement for Tibetans as it demonstrated strong bipartisan support for Tibet and the Tibetan cause. Among other things, the Bill reaffirmed the US policy of supporting direct dialogue between the People’s Republic of China and representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama without any preconditions.

Although unlikely to be accepted under the present repressive regime in Beijing, the American legislation serves as a reminder to China that the world has not forgotten the Land of Snows.

As noted in an earlier column, the Act rightly asserts that the “claims made by officials of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times are historically inaccurate”. This is exactly what Ambassador Sinha has demonstrated in his well-researched book. His argument is important because it analyses, in scholarly language, the ‘Great Game(s)’ which cost Tibet its independence in the 1950s. It has serious implications for the disputed Indo-Tibet border.

A Rider in the Act

On 12 July 2024, US President Joe Biden signed the Bill into law.

The White House released a communiqué: “Today, I have signed into law the ‘Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act’. I share the Congress’s bipartisan commitment to advancing the human rights of Tibetans and supporting efforts to preserve their distinct linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage.”

Unfortunately, there is an unnecessary rider in President Biden’s communiqué that partially negates the content of the act, as the One-China Policy is reiterated: “The Act does not change longstanding, bipartisan United States policy to recognise the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas of China as part of the People’s Republic of China.”

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the new law will concretely lead to genuine autonomy, as the occupation of Tibet by China is confirmed in the communiqué. 

Furthermore, in view of the present deep antagonism between the US and China, it is not clear how Washington can facilitate a resolution of the differences and lead to a negotiated agreement on Tibet.

The Nikkei Asia in Tokyo commented that the Resolve Tibet Act “does not change Washington’s long-standing policy that recognises Tibet as part of China.” However, Beijing immediately protested vehemently: “The Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, one of at least five entities that issued separate but similar statements, called Tibet a ‘sacred territory’ and an ‘inalienable part of China’.”

A foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing affirmed that the law “grossly interferes in China’s domestic affairs, severely undermines China’s interests, and sends a gravely wrong signal to the ‘Tibet independence forces’.”

The Nikkei also mentions the Dalai Lama’s succession: “According to Tibetan Buddhist belief, the Dalai Lama’s spirit will be reincarnated in his successor, who will be born the moment he dies. The Chinese Communist Party considers the current Dalai Lama a ‘separatist, a reactionary, and a wolf in sheep’s clothing,’ and has claimed the right to approve any successor.”

The Japanese financial paper added that the Dalai Lama had repeated publicly that he was not asking for independence. The Tibetan leader is quoted as saying: “I am not seeking separation from China. I am committed to my middle-way approach, whereby Tibet remains within the People’s Republic of China, enjoying a high degree of self-rule or autonomy. I firmly believe that this is of mutual benefit both to the Tibetans as well as to the Chinese.”

Where is India in this?

It is necessary to point out that the interests of Washington and Delhi differ since India has had for nearly seven decades now, a long-standing ‘hot’ dispute with Beijing over the Indo-Tibet border. Hopefully, the Tibetans will take this into consideration when they talk to Chinese officials.

On 17 July, PTI reported that Sikyong Penpa Tsering, the elected leader of the Tibetans, rightly said, “If there has to be a resolution, it should be based on international law—that is the first aspect of this act. … Even though we are asking for some kind of autonomy under the Middle-Way policy, the concept of autonomy is not defined in international law. The only thing that is defined in international law is self-determination.”

Tsering, however, added an interesting new element: “But we decided to change our policy a little bit in the sense that when we speak about the Middle-way, then there needs to be polarities. Without polarities, there cannot be a middle-way, and without recognition of the polarities, there is no value for the middle-way.”

Tsering explained what he meant by two polarities: the first is “the present situation in Tibet under the ‘repressive’ Chinese communist government”, and the second is the “historical status of Tibet as an independent state”.

Ambassador Sinha’s book covers the first ‘polarity’.

Regarding the second, the situation inside Tibet is presently very tense and certainly not conducive to a settlement.

Just to take an example, the Chinese government has recently closed down a prominent vocational high school in a Tibetan area in Qinghai province, “making it the latest in a slew of Tibetan private schools that have been forcibly closed in recent years”, according to Radio Free Asia (RFA)

RFA gives some details. “The Gangjong Sherig Norling school in Golog county is in the historical Amdo region of Tibet. It was founded in 1994 by Ragya Jigme Gyaltsen, the principal, and is renowned for its modern and traditional education on Tibetan culture, philosophy and religion.”

On 14 July, it was announced in both Tibetan and Mandarin that the school had to close because it was not in compliance “with standards set by the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee for vocational schools”. This has created “concern among Tibetans over efforts by Chinese authorities to eradicate Tibetan language and culture.”

Videos of the closure ceremony showed students in tears: “The students, dressed in traditional Tibetan attire, were seen carrying the traditional Tibetan white ceremonial scarves as a mark of respect and gratitude for the school. During the past three decades, the school has served as a vital hub of learning for Tibetan cultural and linguistic studies, drawing youth from across Tibet, Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia.” The school’s curriculum, which included English, computer science, engineering, medicine, filmmaking, and physical education, was probably too ‘reactionary’ for the Communist Party.

In any case, if negotiations take place, Tibetans should add a ‘third polarity’: India and its northern border. Regardless of whether they want to end up under China’s administration or not, India will remain Tibet’s neighbour. Therefore, Delhi should be consulted and taken on board any new initiative.


This is a slightly modified version of the article originally published as Claude Arpi. 2024. ‘America's Resolve Tibet Act and India as third polarity in Sino-Tibetan negotiations’. Firstpost. 28 July.