Quadrupedal Robots on the Roof of the World: Robotic Integration in the PLA’s Western Theatre Command

Abstract

This article documents the confirmed theatre-wide integration of quadrupedal robots commonly known as ‘robotic dogs’ and the armed Chinese variant known as the ‘Robot Wolves’ (jiqi lang, 机器狼), across all major People’s Liberation Army Ground Force formations under the Western Theatre Command facing India. Drawing on original Chinese-language primary sources from official PLA news websites, verified social media accounts on Weibo, Bilibili, and Baidu, and corroborated by secondary analyses, it maps confirmed integration and application across WTC formations – the Tibet Military Region, the Xinjiang Military Region, the 76th Group Army, and the 77th Group Army. It further argues that this constitutes a doctrinal shift from deterrence-by-presence to deterrence through autonomous capability, creating significant escalation risks along the Line of Actual Control with India in the absence of any bilateral agreement regulating autonomous weapons systems. The article concludes with specific policy recommendations for India.

Keywords: quadrupedal robots; manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T); Western Theatre Command (WTC); India-Tibet border; People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF); order of battle (Orbat)

On 18 April 2026, CCTV’s Military Report broadcast a unit of the Tibet Military Region (TMR) conducting a field evaluation of a quadrupedal robot with an acoustic weapon mounted on its back (Sina 2026). Dubbed by the Chinese netizens as ‘directional sonic weapon’, the device is capable of projecting disorientating sound across mountainous terrain to flush concealed targets from obscured positions. Earlier in February, on the Tibetan Plateau, a unit of the People’s Liberation Army’s 77th Group Army conducted a brigade-level coordinated manned-unmanned drill (Guofang Shibao 2026). Critically, it was the final major People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) formation within the Western Theatre Command (WTC) to confirm quadrupedal robot integration.

These exercises were not conducted in isolation but form a deliberate display of armed robots already being systematically integrated across one of the world’s highest and most contested frontiers in the Himalayas. Since 2024, the PLAGF has progressively fielded modified Unitree Go2 robotic dogs and upgraded Robot Wolves across all major formations in the WTC, including the TMR, the 76th Group Army, the Xinjiang Military Region (XMR), and the 77th Group Army. These units are directly and indirectly responsible for tactical and strategic operations on China’s western border including for responding to conflict with India (U.S. Department of Defense 2025). These formations also include the border defence units that have clashed with Indian soldiers on multiple occasions, including in the Galwan Valley clash in 2020 and the Arunachal Pradesh face-off in 2021.

China has not merely tested autonomous ground systems on the Himalayan border. It has embedded them, formation by formation, altitude by altitude, as standing doctrine. The robotic arms race in the Himalayas is no longer a forecast. It is a fact. This integration, driven by a formally codified doctrine of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T), is now being embedded across PLA ground operations. Tibet and Xinjiang have effectively become the primary testing ground for deploying MUM-T with quadrupedal robots, signalling a push to secure strategic advantages along the Indian border. The same doctrine is advancing simultaneously on China’s eastern front. On 25 October 2025, PLA assault exercises employed multiple Robot Wolves armed with rifles and rocket launchers to spearhead operations aimed at Taiwan, confirming that the quadruped robot is now a standard combined-arms addition across both of China’s principal strategic theatres (Junqing Sudi 2025).

As the ‘robotic arms race’ escalates across the Himalayas, India has begun responding – approximately 100 military-grade robot dogs were deployed in high-altitude border areas in 2024 for surveillance and logistics support (The Times of India 2025). However, as this article demonstrates, the scale, weaponisation, and doctrinal integration of China’s quadrupedal robotics programme far exceed India’s current posture, and the gap is widening. This shift towards strengthening unmanned weapon systems in WTC’s regions of Tibet and Xinjiang sends a strong signal of preparation for future robotic warfare, while also exposing the contradiction in China’s simultaneous affirmation of its commitment to resetting ties with India. Behind China’s public commitment to a non-offensive posture, lies a dual strategy of diplomatic engagement and advancing autonomous military capacity.

Prior reporting on PLA quadrupedal robots in the WTC has largely been episodic, limited to single exercises or units, or isolated demonstrations. However, this study provides comprehensive accounts of quadruped robot integration spanning across all major WTC formations based on original Chinese-language primary sources, including official PLA news websites, verified social media accounts on Weibo, Bilibili, and Baidu. The evidence establishes that China’s robotic integration in the WTC is not episodic but theatre-wide, not experimental but doctrinal.

The MUM-T Framework: Doctrine Behind the Quadrupedal Robots

MUM-T is defined by the US Army Aviation Center of Excellence as ‘the synchronised employment of soldiers, manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, robotics, and sensors to achieve enhanced situational understanding, greater lethality, and improved survivability’ (Rossetti 2020). The PLAGF’s version of MUM-T is characterised by an emphasis on augmentation over autonomy, where unmanned systems support human-controlled platforms rather than replacing human decision-making (Mei 2025). In the WTC context, this doctrine has manifested across three major operational roles.

Forward logistics augmentation. Quadrupedal robots carry ammunition, rations, and medical supplies to forward positions where road or transportational infrastructure is destroyed or impassable. Unitree B1-class robots demonstrated 25–40kg payload capacities in the January 2025 Xinjiang exercise, extending operational reach into terrain that would otherwise leave border units along the LAC logistically exposed (Huanqiu Wang 2025).

Reconnaissance and squad-level ISR. Equipped with electro-optical systems, thermal sensors, and cameras, robot dogs function as expendable forward reconnaissance platforms, scouting enemy positions ahead of soldiers, as demonstrated in the Southern XMR’s July 2025 exercise at 5,300 metres (Yangshi Junshi 2025a).

Direct combat integration. The militarised quadrupedal robots integrate mounted QBZ-95 assault rifles, acoustic weapons, rocket launchers, and grenade systems. By mid-2025, Chinese exercises validated a full offensive sequence including reconnaissance, mine clearance, obstacle breaching, fire support, all incorporating quadrupedal robots alongside human infantry, as confirmed in the 76th Group Army’s ‘unmanned offensive drill (Bilibili 2025).

These three roles constitute what Chinese doctrine terms a ‘comprehensive manned-unmanned teaming drill’ (youren wuren xietong zonghe yanlian, 有人无人协同综合演练), the precise language appearing in the official PLA Weibo account of the 77th Group Army’s February 2026 plateau exercise (Guofang Shibao 2026). The Quadrupedal robots are not a peripheral addition, it is a doctrinal instrument of force multiplication at the tactical and operational levels. The PLA Daily noted in March 2026 that unmanned combat forces are ‘accelerating their transformation from auxiliary tools to trusted partners and close comrades-in-arms’ (Wang and Zhao 2026). For India, the combat role of PLA’s quadrupedal robots represents a distinct and escalating threat along the LAC, one that India’s current posture is not yet equipped to counter at an equivalent scale.

Integration of Quadrupedal robots into WTC’s Order of Battle: Formation-wise (2024-2026)

Table 1 on the order of battle, drawing on Chinese primary sources and corroborated by secondary analyses, establishes that quadrupedal robot integration in the Western Theatre Command is theatre-wide and operational.

 

Sources: Based on official PLA news or verified unit social media accounts. See endnotes for full citations.

Xinjiang Military Region (XMR)

The Xinjiang Military Region (XMR) covers all of Xinjiang and its southern military jurisdiction, known as the Southern Xinjiang Military Region (SXMR), which critically encompasses the south of the Tianshan mountains and the Ngari Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region, bordering India’s Ladakh, Uttarakhand, and Himachal Pradesh (Shukla 2020). The SXMR oversees both the western and central sectors of the LAC, and its military units have clashed with Indian troops on multiple occasions, including the ‘Black Top’ skirmish, Pangong Tso standoff, and Galwan Valley clash in 2020.

Most recently, in July 2025, a unit of XMR conducted a reconnaissance drill at an altitude of 5,300 metres along the India-Tibet border employing a robot dog, UAVs, and an electro-optical system. The training simulated offensive operations in a border area with enemy barracks, demonstrating how reconnaissance tactics combining robot dogs and UAVs could be employed against an adversary position (Yangshi Junshi 2025a). A unit of SXMR’s ‘confrontational drill’ conducted in March 2025 showcased a capacity to carry out not only logistics but also combat operations with robotic dogs, unmanned vehicles, and drones in the areas near the western and central LAC section (Zhongguo Jun Hao 2025). The drill integrated both the militarily modified Unitree robot dog, used mostly for logistics and reconnaissance, and the upgraded Robot Wolf, equipped with mounted weapons for combat roles. This was preceded by another border drill carried out by a unit of XMR in January 2025, in which the unit tested robotic dogs and exoskeletons for logistical operations across the plateau terrain, in proximity to India’s border at 5,300 metres (Huanqiu Wang 2025).

The cumulative evidence makes clear that robotic dogs, alongside other quadrupedal robots, are becoming a common feature of the XMR’s border forces and that they are capable of performing all three key MUM-T roles, including logistics, reconnaissance, and combat along the India-Tibet border.

Tibet Military Region (TMR)

The whole of the Tibet Autonomous Region, except for Ngari prefecture, falls under the jurisdiction of TMR, thereby sharing borders with Nepal, Bhutan, and India’s Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. The first major public indication of the PLA’s robotic dogs in TMR came during the China-Nepal joint exercise on 22 September 2024, when soldiers and technicians from the TMR demonstrated robot dogs to Nepali soldiers (Netease 2024). This may represent calibrated strategic signalling directed at India, given the TMR’s primary orientation towards the eastern sector of the boundary dispute with India.

The unmanned equipment field evaluation of a robot dog armed with an acoustic weapon by a unit of TMR in April 2026 demonstrated how this device can be tactically suited to traverse and is capable of exposing adversary positions through the gorges, barrens, and mountainous terrain of the Himalayan operational environment (Sina 2026).

In December 2025, a unit of the TMR conducted a significant combat drill at 4,300 metres, where a mixed combat group comprising unmanned, assault, firepower, and electronic warfare elements rapidly deployed and initiated high-altitude offensive operations in which robotic dogs simultaneously performed reconnaissance, mine clearance, coordinated weapons strikes, and battlefield medical resupply (Yangshi Junshi 2025b). This drill demonstrated human-machine collaborative combat capabilities in the complex plateau environment. Three features of this exercise stand out. First, the altitude exceeds 4,300 metres, confirming quadrupedal robots’ operational utility at LAC-relevant elevations. Second, the multiple simultaneous tasks executed constitute the full spectrum of tactical employment for a quadrupedal robot, well beyond a logistics demonstration. Third, the combined-arms grouping of unmanned, assault, firepower, acoustic, and electronic warfare elements mirrors the mainstream MUM-T formation described in PLA doctrine, confirming that the TMR covering the eastern part of LAC is executing formal doctrine rather than conducting improvised field experiments.

76th Group Army

The 76th Group Army is one of the principal forces under the WTC, primarily deployed across the Tibetan Plateau, including Qinghai and Gansu provinces, with approximately 50,000 soldiers (Desai 2023). It serves as the primary contingency force tasked with tactical and strategic operations along the Indian border.

In July 2025, a brigade of the 76th Group Army conducted an ‘Manned-Unmanned Teaming Offensive Confrontational Drill’ (youren wuren xietong gongji duikang yanlian, 有人无人协同攻击对抗演练) that demonstrated the incorporation of MUM-T doctrine across combat, logistics, and reconnaissance roles (Bilibili 2025). This exercise highlights the PLA’s growing emphasis on multi-domain integration of autonomous systems for force projection in high-altitude frontier environments. During the 2020 India-China border standoff, hundreds of tanks and other weapons of the 76th Group Army were transported into Tibet to reinforce Chinese troops along the India-Tibet border (China Arms 2020). Building on that precedent, the 76th Group Army is moving towards formalising plans to deploy robot wolves across multiple Combined Arms Brigades (CAB), synchronising their coordination with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for potential future confrontation, as reported in Chinese domestic media (Netease 2025).

77th Group Army

The 77th Group Army is the second principal contingency force for the LAC stationed across the Tibetan plateau and its surrounding areas, including Sichuan province and Chongqing. In February 2026, a brigade of the 77th Group Army conducted a ‘comprehensive manned-unmanned teaming drill’ (youren wuren xietong zonghe yanlian, 有人无人协同综合演练) (Guofang Shibao 2026). According to an official post from the 77th Group Army’s verified Weibo account, the exercise implemented MUM-T employing UAVs and robot dogs armed with mounted assault rifles in high-altitude mountainous terrain akin to the India-Tibet border. This major exercise marked the final confirmation of theatre-wide quadrupedal robot integration across the WTC.

Comparative Assessment: India and China’s Military Quadrupedal Robots

In this era of strategic competition between Asia’s two major powers, military robots are emerging as the next frontier of the arms race. The major difference between India’s and China’s military development lies in the extent of militarisation, weapons integration, and deployment scale.

Weaponisation. According to an Indian report in October 2024, the Indian Army was still exploring weaponizing robotic dogs with anti-drone capabilities (Indian Defence Research Wing 2024). The Indian Army’s robotic dogs, inducted under the MULE (Multi-Utility Legged Equipment) series, primarily perform logistics and support roles, including detection, safety, surveillance, and transportation operations (Falor 2023). China, by contrast, is publicly demonstrating highly weaponised robotic dogs and wolves specialised for both combat and support operations in proximity to the disputed areas. Chinese military scientists have proposed arming ground robots with thermobaric warheads, effectively functioning as a ‘mini nuke’ to achieve ‘comprehensive annihilation’ of military positions (Chen 2025).

Military-Civil Fusion. Chinese state-owned and private companies in the strategic robotic industry, such as Unitree, are widely documented mass-producing robotic dogs, which have been confirmed in use by the PLA forces in Xinjiang and Tibet (Sohu 2024). Unitree’s CEO met Communist Party of China General Secretary Xi Jinping alongside Huawei’s CEO in February 2025, and the company confirmed technological supplies to PLA formations through military-linked university procurement channels, bypassing formal procurement timelines (Tang 2025).

Export and Proliferation Risk. China’s military robot dog exports are accelerating, with Southeast Asia and the Middle East as the leading destinations (Jin 2025). A strong China-Pakistan defence partnership creates a credible pathway, though unconfirmed, for quadrupedal robot technology transfer to India’s hostile neighbour on its western flank.

Strategic Implications. The increasing induction of quadrupedal robots along with other unmanned systems is part of China’s broader strategy to achieve the mechanization, informationization, and intelligentisation (jixiehua, xinxihua yu zhinenghua, 機械化、信息化與智能化) of the PLA before 2050. China’s theatre-wide robotic integration in the WTC carries four major strategic implications for India.

China’s Permanent Plateau Vulnerability. Since China annexed Tibet in the 1950s, the harsh terrain and unforgiving environment of the Tibetan Plateau have posed a persistent operational challenge for Chinese forces stationed in Tibet. These forces continue to consist predominantly of Han Chinese soldiers from mainland China, who to this day fail to adequately adapt to the high altitude, facing significant physical, psychological, and morale challenges. Due to chronic mountain sickness, the Chinese PLA regularly organises psychological counselling, establishes oxygen chambers and insulated barracks, and deploys teams of therapists to frontline border posts in Tibet and Xinjiang (Zheng, Zeng, Pan and Liu 2022). The quadrupedal robot bypasses these constraints entirely. Robotic integration is, therefore, not merely a doctrinal preference, but a strategic necessity imposed by the operational environment itself.

Force Multiplier. The quadruped robots, when integrated with swarm drones, as demonstrated by the PLA’s ‘drone swarms and robot wolf pack joint combat drill’ (wuren ji feng qun jiqi lang qun xietong zuozhan yanxi, 无人机蜂群机器“狼群”协同作战演习), illustrate how a combination of ground robots and drones efficiently serves as a force multiplier, enhancing combat strength (Yangshi Xinwen 2025). Fu Qianhshao, a Chinese military affairs expert, has emphasized that integrating ground robots into combat could be more effective than aerial drones (Liu and Rui 2025). The robot dogs bridge critical operational gaps in the harsh terrain and extreme geographic conditions of the India-Tibet border, where drones cannot perform reliably. Furthermore, the capability to mount any devices or weapons like small arms, rockets, bombs, or counter-drone equipment creates broad operational possibilities. The Chinese military is now pursuing the goal of equipping the robot dogs with anti-drone capability, replicating the capability of the US military’s anti-drone ‘Vision 60’ quadruped robot (Gigazine 2024).

Escalation and Autonomous Violence. A quadruped robot engaging an Indian patrol, or a cyber-compromised robot dog triggering an armed response, could pose escalation risks along the tense India-China border. The Chinese PLA’s attempts to procure Nvidia chips for robot dogs point toward a future of AI-driven autonomy at the tactical edge, where ‘the brain on the robot’ could independently decide whether a human represents an enemy threat, with potentially lethal consequences in one of the world’s most sensitive border environments (Gigazine 2024).

Dual-Track Strategy. China’s robotic arms buildup along the Himalayan frontier directly contradicts its public posture of border normalisation and diplomatic reset with India. The lack of treaties and agreements on the regulation of autonomous weapons and robotic systems between India and China raises the risk of escalation or incident in the near future. The increasing production of Robot Wolves, publicly demonstrated at the Zhuhai Air Show 2024 (Sohu 2024) and their accelerating integration across the WTC PLAGF formations signal a trajectory toward mass deployment across the Himalayan frontier.

Limitations

A major limitation of military robotic dogs is their battery life, which reportedly lasts fewer than five hours. However, China has made progress in addressing this constraint with the development of a self-charging robot known as the S2 humanoid robot capable of changing its own battery. Additionally, a doctrine-reality gap has been documented (Mei 2025), highlighting that many PLA line units lack the confidence and the technical skills to employ autonomous systems under operational conditions, representing a genuine constraint on immediate operational utility. The exercises and drills documented in this article nonetheless reflect a consistent and accelerating trajectory toward integration.

A further limitation concerns source verification. All the primary sources in this analysis are drawn from the Chinese state media and official PLA social media accounts, including verified Weibo and Bilibili channels. These sources carry institutional authority but are not independently verifiable and may reflect bias and deliberate information campaigns rather than an accurate portrayal of operational capability.

Policy Recommendations for India’s Strategic Response

This section advances five specific policy recommendations for India’s strategic response to China’s confirmed quadrupedal robot integration in the WTC’s order of battle.

Accelerate the MULE weaponization track.  The Indian Army’s MULE (Multi-Utility Legged Equipment) programme, documented in section IV, must move from logistics and surveillance roles towards anti-drone and direct-fire capability. Fielding a counter-ground robot capability within the Indian Army’s LAC-facing troops by 2028-30 should take strategic priority, given the scale of quadrupedal robot deployment in already confirmed WTC formations.

Prioritise jamming ground robots’ datalinks. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation programme in Advanced Electronic Warfare should incorporate ground robots datalink disruption as a dedicated line of effort. Targeting the command-and-control links of the Chinese quadrupedal robots is cost-effective and operationally sound.

Develop a bilateral LAC autonomous systems agreement. There is a critical lack of international or bilateral mechanisms for dealing with unmanned system incidents (Rust and Jiang 2026). There is no publicly known formal or informal agreement between India and China addressing unmanned platforms and robots; the October 2024 patrolling agreement between the two countries contained no provisions addressing robotic or autonomous systems. Some sort of an agreement is, therefore, essential.

Institutionalise MUM-T doctrine across all LAC-facing troops. The Indian Army’s SARVSHAKTI exercise conducted in Sikkim in April 2025 was a major milestone towards building a MUM-T capability in Trishakti Corps (Siliguri), which faces the Tibet Military Region and 77th Group Army across the eastern LAC and Sikkim sector (ANI 2025). However, the Indian Army must now move urgently to convert the field success into a binding operational doctrine, with priority given to 14 Corps (Leh) facing the western and central sectors of the LAC.

Monitor Chinese quadrupedal robot technology exports to Pakistan. India’s strategic monitoring community should actively track any potential transfer of Chinese quadrupedal robot technology to Pakistani security forces. Given Pakistan’s strong defence partnership with China, military technology transfer is a credible near-future scenario rather than a hypothetical one.

 

Conclusion

The evidence documented in this analysis establishes that China’s quadrupedal robotic integration is not simply a future threat but a present operational reality; there is confirmed integration in all major PLAGF formations in the WTC facing India. As quadruped robots become increasingly autonomous globally, the Chinese PLA is attempting to procure AI chips for its robotic dogs, and the threats posed by China’s highly weaponized and AI-driven robotic platforms are intensifying (Rollet 2025).

Regardless of the current warming ties between India and China, the accelerating deployment of quadrupedal combat robots in Tibet and Xinjiang represents a credible trigger for the next major flashpoint event, driven by a lack of embedded human intelligence, cyber-attack vulnerability, and machine errors within the autonomous unmanned systems operating along the extremely sensitive India-Tibet border. Not only have the killer robot dogs been deployed in Tibet and Xinjiang, but they could also be potentially exported to India’s hostile western neighbour. The lack of treaties and agreements on the regulation of autonomous weapons and robotic systems between India and China accentuates the robotic arms and weapon race and the possibility of conflict in the near future.

As part of strategic domestic industries under the Made in China 2025 industrial policy, the Chinese robotics industry has received tremendous governmental incentives and economic support. Chinese state-owned and private robotic companies, such as Unitree, have been officially reported to have been mass-producing robotic dogs, which are used by the Chinese PLA forces in Xinjiang and Tibet (Jin 2025). The possibility of autonomous violence remains significant, as the gun-bearing robotic dogs, called ‘AI killer robots,’ are deployed in Tibet and Xinjiang. A robotic platform with the capability to independently decide whether a human is an enemy could not only endanger Tibetans and Uyghurs but also threaten security and stability across the broader Himalayan region.
 

REFERENCES

ANI. 2025. ‘Indian Army Successfully Showcases MUM-T Capability During Exercise SARVSHAKTI’. 5 April. https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/indian-army-successfully-showcases-mum-t-capability-during-exercise-sarvshakti20250405183211/

Bilibili. 2025. ‘Qi mengle, kanjian wo jun “jiqi lang” zhengzai fadong jingong ~’ (起猛了,看见我军“机器狼”正在发动进攻~) [Wake up! I see our army’s “Robot Wolf” is launching an attack.] 14 July. https://www.bilibili.com/video/av114851200376816/

Chen, Stephen. 2025. ‘China arms combat robots with controversial thermobaric weapon in urban warfare drill’.  South China Morning Post. 25 February. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3299415/china-arms-combat-robots-controversial-thermobaric-weapon-urban-warfare-drill

China Arms. 2020. ‘Type 99 tanks of the 76th Army reach the Tibetan Plateau’. 12 June. https://www.china-arms.com/2020/06/type-99-tank-plateau/

Desai, Suyash. 2023 ‘Assessing the Role of the PLA Southern Theater Command in a China-India Contingency’. Jamestown Foundation. 17 February.
https://jamestown.org/assessing-the-role-of-the-pla-southern-theater-command-in-a-china-india-contingency/

Falor, Sanskriti. 2023. ‘Army develops multi-utility legged equipment. Here’s how it works’. Hindustan Times. 16 September. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-develops-multi-utility-legged-equipment-heres-how-it-works-101694566902593.html

Gigazine. 2024. ‘US military unveils robot dog with gun to shoot down drones’. 08 August. https://gigazine.net/gsc_news/en/20240808/robot-dog-with-gun/

Guofang Shibao (国防时报) [National Defense Times]. 2026. ‘Youren wuren xietong kai lian’ (有人无人协同开练) [Manned-Unmanned Teaming Training Underway]. February 12. http://archive.today/1r9OF

Huanqiu Wang (环球网) [Global Times]. 2025. ‘Wai guge, jiqi gou... gaoyuan yan bing keji gan baopeng’ (外骨骼,机器狗......高原演兵科技感爆棚) [Exoskeletons, robotic dogs... the high-altitude military exercises are bursting with technological sophistication] 13 January. http://archive.today/qjyv9

Indian Defence Research Wing. 2024. ‘Indian Army Explores Robot Dogs for Anti-Drone Warfare’. 14 October. https://idrw.org/indian-army-explores-robot-dogs-for-anti-drone-warfare/#google_vignette

Jin Ji (晋激). 2025. ‘Zhongguo junyong jiqi quan waixiao jiasu! Zhongdong, dongnanya weihe zhengxian?’ (中国军用机器犬外销加速!中东,东南亚为何争先) [China’s Military Robot Dog Exports Are Accelerating! Why Are the Middle East and Southeast Asia Leading the Charge?’]. Baidu. 25 April. https://archive.ph/fm2ka#selection-157.0-185.9

Junqing Sudi (军情速递) [Military Intelligence Briefs]. 2025. ‘Jiefangjun “jiqi lang” qiangtan denglu shou xiu! Wuren zuozhan zhuangbei jiang danren “deng dao” xianfeng’ (解放军 “机器狼” 抢滩登陆首秀!无人作战装备将担任 “登岛” 先锋) [PLA’s “Robot Wolf” makes its first beach landing appearance! Unmanned combat equipment will serve as the pioneer in “landing on the island.”]. 25 October. http://archive.today/hmOw8

Liu Xuanzun and Liang Rui. 2025. ‘China’s Robot Wolves Join PLA Exercise, Official Media Reveals’. People’s Daily Online. 16 July. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0716/c90000-20340789.html

Mei, Shanshan. 2025. ‘The People’s Liberation Army’s Approach to Manned-Unmanned Teaming: Theory and Practice.’ RAND Corporation. 12 August. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3906-1.html

Netease. 2024. ‘Zhu cang budui xiang nibo’er junren zhanshi jiqi gou he zhencha qiu, ni jun yanjing dou zhile’ (驻藏部队向尼泊尔军人展示机器狗和侦察球,尼军眼睛都直了) [The Tibetan troops showed the Nepalese soldiers a robot dog and a reconnaissance ball, and the Nepalese soldiers were all stunned]. 23 September. https://archive.ph/L7jFf

Netease. 2025. ‘Daguo cai wan de qi: “Jiqi zhan lang” zai 76 jituanjun puji, meiguo zaojia shi zhongguo 20 bei’ (大国才玩得起:“机器战狼”在76集团军普及,美国造价是中国20倍) [Only major powers can afford to play this game: “Mechanical Wolf Warriors” are widely used in the 76th Group Army, and the cost for the US is 20 times that of China]. 17 July. https://archive.ph/A0jvk#selection-1695.0-1695.138

Rollet, Charles. 2025. ‘China’s Military Tried to Buy Nvidia Chips for AI Servers and a Robot Dog, Documents Show’. Business Insider. 1 August. https://www.businessinsider.com/china-army-nvidia-chips-servers-pla-robot-dog-2025-

Rossetti, Livio. 2020. ‘Manned-Unmanned Teaming: A Great Opportunity or Mission Overload?’ Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC). January. https://www.japcc.org/articles/manned-unmanned-teaming/

Rust, Robert and Jiang, Tianjiao. 2026. ‘The US and China Need to Talk About Unmanned Nukes’. The Diplomat. 15 April. https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/the-us-and-china-need-to-talk-about-unmanned-nukes/

Shukla, Ajai. 2020. ‘Border dispute: China has over 200,000 soldiers opposite India in Western Theatre Command’. Business Standard. 20 July. https://www.ajaishukla.com/2020/07/border-dispute-china-has-over-200000.html

Sina. 2026. ‘“Dingxiang shengbo wuqi”? Lun zu jiqi lang bei ge da laba chong chulai, zhijie wei zhanshimen bofang chongfeng hao’ (“定向声波武器”? 轮足机器狼背个大喇叭冲出来,直接为战士们播放冲锋号) [“Directional Sonic Weapon”? A wheeled-legged robotic wolf charges out, carrying a massive loudspeaker-broadcasting the charge sound directly to the soldiers]. 20 April. http://k.sina.com.cn/article_2059102192_m7abb67f0033018rnu.html 

Sohu.  2024. ‘We Are Not Hiding It Anymore. Even the Production Line of the Robot Wolf Has Been Exposed, and It’s an Assembly Line!’ 12 November. https://archive.ph/z31hj#selection-367.0-367.27

Tang, Jane. 2025. ‘The Robot Dog’s Time to Kill’: At China’s Star Robotics Firm, the Military Ties Keep Mounting.’ Kharon. 16 July. https://www.kharon.com/brief/unitree-robotics-china-pla

The Times of India. 2025.‘Robotic Dogs Revolutionize Army Combat Drills for Enhanced Border Security.’ 24 September. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/robotic-dogs-revolutionize-army-combat-drills-for-enhanced-border-security/articleshow/115606173.cms

U.S. Department of Defense. 2025. ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025’. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 23 December. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF

Wang Kai and Zhao Di (王 凯, 赵 頔). 2026. ‘Liqing youren yu wuren zuozhan liliang guanxi goujian de neihan yaoyi’ (厘清有人与无人作战力量关系构建的内涵要义) [Clarifying the Essence of the Relationship Between Manned and Unmanned Combat Forces]. Zhongguo Jun Wang-Jiefangjun Bao (中国军网-解放军报) [China Military Online - PLA Daily]. 17 March. http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16449268.html

Yangshi Junshi (央视军事) [CCTV Military]. 2025a. ‘Haiba 5300 mi xue yu gaoyuan zhencha bing xunlian xianchang’ (海拔5300米雪域高原侦察兵训练现场) [Scout training at the snowy plateau at an altitude of 5,300 meters] 17 July. https://archive.ph/antJN#selection-1555.13-1560.0

Yangshi Junshi (央视军事) [CCTV Military]. 2025b. ‘Gaoyuan yan xun jiqi gou zhan li la man’ (高原演训机器狗战力拉满) [Robot Dogs Unleash Full Combat Prowess in High-Altitude Drills]. Weibo. 19 December. http://archive.today/Nz8vA

Yangshi Xinwen (央视新闻) [CCTV News]. 2025. ‘Wuren ji feng qun, jiqi “lang qun” xietong zuozhan yanxi, lujun shouci pilu wu ren hua zuozhan moshi!’ (无人机“蜂群”、机器“狼群”协同作战演习，陆军首次披露无人化作战模式) [Cooperative Combat Exercises Featuring Drone “Swarms” and Robotic “Wolfpacks”—Army Reveals Unmanned Combat Modalities for the First Time!]. 3 August. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=7242522752520119853

Zheng Yanfen, Zeng Fanjie, Pan Rui and Liu Shuyong (郑艳芬、曾凡杰、潘锐、刘术勇). 2022. ‘Xinli fuwu bianguan xing, wei yixian bianfang guanbing zhuru “xin dongli”’ [Psychological Services at the Border-Injecting “Mental Vitality” into Frontline Border Defense Troops]. Weixin. 28 November. https://archive.ph/XmPw7

Zhongguo Jun Hao (中国军号) [Chinese Military Bugle]. 2025. ‘Da kai yanjie! Dang duikang yanxi yu shang keji’ (大开眼界!当对抗演习遇上科技) [An Eye-Opener! When Combat Drills Meet Technology]. 30 March. https://archive.ph/JDYad#selection-159.1-159.60

---

 About the Author: Tenzin Younten is a researcher specialising in China's defence, security, foreign policy, and India-China relations. He can be contacted at his email id [email protected].