Old Game, New Players: Taliban Balances between China and the United States

On 19^th September, US President Donald Trump once again repeated his intention to retake Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, citing its proximity to Chinese nuclear sites, and if the Taliban did not agree, “bad things are going to happen”, he wrote on his social media. In response, the Taliban declared they were unwilling to negotiate the country’s “independence and territorial integrity”. China voiced support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, signaling resistance to renewed Western militarization in the region.

But behind the scenes, the Taliban and Americans have quietly been normalizing relations. Just recently, the Taliban negotiated prisoner swaps as part of the normalization process. The Taliban may be reassessing the limits of their relationship with Beijing—especially after China and Russia did not jump to support Iran significantly during Israeli strikes on Iran. The Taliban may want to remain on the right side of the US, instead of antagonizing it by getting too close to China.

Afghanistan has long walked a tightrope between competing empires. From the British-Russian Great Game to the Cold War rivalry between the US and USSR, its rulers have relied on strategic balancing to preserve sovereignty and extract benefits—sometimes succeeding, and at other times collapsing under external and internal pressure.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Afghanistan’s foreign policy was shaped by British interests that limited Russian influence across the Amu Darya. When Amanullah Khan declared independence in 1919 to shake off British control, his monarchy collapsed. Similarly, King Zahir Shah balanced U.S. and Soviet support after World War II. But when President Daoud Khan attempted to reduce Soviet influence and tilt toward the Americans, pro-Soviet forces launched a coup in 1978, plunging Afghanistan into decades of war.

The Taliban are attempting a similar act—this time between China and the US. Following the American withdrawal in 2021, China-Taliban relations witnessed a notable surge. From strengthening diplomatic ties to signing investment deals, the relationship seemed poised for strategic expansion. In January 2023, the Taliban signed a landmark 25-year agreement with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC) for oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin. Touted as a turning point in the relationship between the two countries, the deal promised job creation and regional integration. But by mid-2025, the agreement had effectively collapsed—marking a turning point in China’s engagement with the Taliban.

In August 2025, Taliban authorities detained 12 Chinese workers from the Amu Darya oil project, confiscated their passports, and suspended operations. Though eight were released in early September, four remain in custody. The Taliban accused the Chinese company of violating contractual obligations—particularly missing royalty payments. In contrast, Chinese sources cited political pressure to revise the contract under unfair terms.

The Amu Darya dispute reveals a stark asymmetry. For the Taliban, China represents legitimacy and potential investment. For China, Afghanistan is a source of strategic risk. While the Taliban have repeatedly asked Beijing to build cold storage facilities, open direct flights to China, and support industrial zones, Chinese responses have been tepid. 

Beijing’s security-first logic remains dominant. Since 2021, China has emphasized the presence of over 20 transnational militant groups in Afghanistan, particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). According to a report by Iraf, between 15,000 and 35,000 Uyghur militants and their families currently reside in northern provinces like Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan, and Nuristan. During the last August visit to Kabul, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly urged the Taliban to expel Uyghur fighters from their ranks—a request with implications for the relationship’s future.

China accepted a Taliban-appointed ambassador but has withheld formal recognition, keeping its diplomatic options open. China continues to work through platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), though Taliban participation remains uncertain.

In an anarchical world where alliances are fluid and driven by self-interest, the Taliban now appear more open to engaging the US—not as a form of capitulation, but as a hedge. Afghanistan has a long, complex history with Western powers: from British and Soviet invasions to American support of the mujahideen and the two-decade-long American occupation. The Taliban, for all their ideological rigidity, are not unfamiliar with Western actors. In contrast, China remains terra incognita—a partner without shared cultural, religious, or historical touchpoints.

China’s Afghanistan policy, once buoyed by the hope of quiet integration into the Belt and Road Initiative, now faces growing uncertainty. The Taliban, too, are adjusting their posture—reopening dialogue with the U.S. and reassessing the limitations of a Beijing-centric strategy.

The art of survival in Afghanistan’s politics has always involved navigating great-power competition without being consumed by it. In 2025, that art is being tested again. Whether the Taliban can maintain this delicate balance—between East and West, between economic needs and political ideology—remains to be seen.

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About the Author: Rustam Ali Seerat is an independent researcher with an interest in the Middle East, South and Central Asia. He closely monitors the ongoing Sino-U.S. rivalry in the region. He can be reached at [email protected]