Mandarin Mission: Iran’s Clerical Outreach to China

Relations between China and Iran are often framed through familiar categories, such as oil exports, the Belt and Road Initiative, and their 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. But this narrow framework now obscures a more intriguing development of recent years. Beyond formal agreements and diplomatic communiqués, a parallel cultural and religious relationship has taken shape – one driven not by foreign ministries but by clerics, online missionaries, and digital religious entrepreneurs.

When discussing China’s cultural outreach elsewhere, the focus is often on the proliferation of Mandarin language centres and Confucius Institutes. In Iran, however, some clergy close to the establishment are attempting to reverse this flow.

Chinese cultural diplomacy in Iran
China has invested in cultural outreach toward Iran. Confucius Institutes and Mandarin training centres operate in two Iranian cities, attracting students interested in commerce, technology, and global careers. Iran currently hosts at least two formal Confucius Institutes, located at the University of Tehran and the University of Mazandaran. The first was established in 2009, marking the start of China’s institutionalised cultural presence in Iran. Yet, Iran hosts far fewer Confucius Institutes than many other countries. Chinese Shiite students also study in the Iranian seminaries in Qom, where they were accused of infecting Iran with COVID-19 in 2020 by a prominent Sunni cleric.  

Chinese officials recognise that cultural literacy is crucial to achieving long-term influence. In October 2025, the Chinese Ambassador to Iran was quoted as saying, ‘Two ancient Asian civilisations are taking effective steps toward mutual cultural and scientific enrichment.’ In February 2023, China and Iran signed an MoU on cultural heritage and were referred to by Chinese media as ‘cradles of Eastern civilisation’.  Huo Zhengxin, a professor at the China University of Political Science and Law, said that ‘China and Iran are two ancient civilisations with long histories. They’ve been closely connected since the days of the ancient Silk Road. Therefore, the cultural cooperation between the two countries has a profound historical foundation as well as pragmatic value.’

The Iranian state also echoes the Chinese side. At the opening of an exhibition in October 2025, the Iranian Minister of Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts stated that ‘Iran and China –  two great civilisations of East and West Asia – have shared deep cultural and commercial ties since ancient times.’ He also noted ‘Iran-China relations are not confined merely to economic dimensions but evolve into a profound bond between the hearts and cultural identities of both nations’.

While China builds cultural literacy inside Iran, however, a small but influential group of Iranian clerics is now attempting the opposite – exporting Shia religious literacy into Mandarin-speaking spaces.

The Chinese akhund

On 18 November, a video went viral showing a young cleric, Amirhossein Javaheri, reciting the Islamic call to prayer [adhan] in Mandarin at a Quranic gathering in Golestan province. Mandarin, previously absent from Iranian mosques, is now making its way into religious spaces. Iranian media treated the Chinese-language adhan as a gesture of ‘global spirituality.’ In reality, it reflects a more complex story about how Iran imagines China and how Iranian religious institutions perceive potential missionary frontiers. Nevertheless, in addition to promoting Shia beliefs in the Chinese language alongside his associate, Mustafa Askar Aqaei, Javaheri also provides Chinese language commercial translation services for tourists and businesses.

In his early 40s, Mustafa Askar Aqaei, widely known as Akhund-e Chini – the Chinese Cleric – now based in Iran, has pioneered the mission of propagating Shia beliefs in China. In 2016, he also recited the call for prayer in Mandarin to Chinese tourists visiting a mosque in Isfahan city. Over time, Aqaei has been elevated into a cultural figure in Iranian state-run media, and his missionary life story has inspired a documentary.

Raised in a modest household in Tabriz, Iran, Aqaei entered the seminary on his father’s encouragement. After briefly studying French, he realised that Iran had many French-speaking clerics but almost no Mandarin speakers. One of his teachers paid for his first lessons; Aqaei then spent two years studying Mandarin three hours a day along with eight other students. In 2009, he made his first trip to China for a short intensive Chinese language learning program at the BLCU. He navigated cities searching online for mosques and walked for hours to reach Chinese Muslims – Uyghurs, Hui, Kazakhs, and others.

Aqaei has been openly critical of Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, arguing that the Chinese government engages in demographic engineering in the Muslim-majority province. However, he also sees great geopolitical potential in China for Iran. He has been quoted as saying, ‘The Communist Party of China does not recognise the United States as a superpower, and for this reason it consistently resists U.S. policies in international matters, such as the Iranian nuclear issue.’ He also noted, ‘Chinese Muslims also view America as the Great Satan, which creates a potential opportunity for anti-American activity.’ Aqaei is also motivated to compete with the Sunni missionaries to China, where they promote the Sunni branch of Islam.

Digital missionaries

China banned missionary work without state approval in May 2025, and the core of Aqaei’s work now takes place online. Over the past decade, Aqaei has built what he calls the first global Shia Islam digital library in Chinese, as well as a Telegram Channel with more than 1,400 subscribers. The contents include Qur’anic translations, doctrinal texts, ritual guides, audio files, and language materials for learning Chinese. Together with Javaheri, he runs a long-standing bilingual blog that introduces Shiite teachings to Mandarin-speaking audiences.

On Instagram, Javaheri mixes Qur’anic translations with political messaging. Images of Benjamin Netanyahu appear alongside Mandarin translations of the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s remarks about Palestine. Chinese-subtitled videos of Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian top general killed by the US during the first Trump Administration, are displayed alongside illustrated Shiite symbols.

Aqaei and Javaheri claim to fund their mission through commercial translations. Whether or not they receive institutional funding is unclear. However, their messaging aligns closely with the ideological currents of the Islamic Republic. What they represent is a new vector of soft power – clerical digital activism aimed at Mandarin-speaking audiences, merging religion and politics in ways that Iran’s official diplomacy cannot openly attempt.

Akhund becomes ahong again

Cultural exchange flows in both directions. An example is the term akhund (clergyman) in Farsi, which was imported from the Chinese word for imam – ahong (阿訇) –  likely from the languages of the Hui people sometime between the 13^th and 16^th centuries via Central Asian Turkic intermediary languages. Now, Aqaei and Javaheri have taken the word back to China.

According to Aqaei, there are about 40,000 Shia in China who do not have their own mosques and refer their religious questions to the Sunni clergymen – a motivation for him to fill this vacuum. Seminaries in Isfahan and Qom (the core of the Iranian religious establishment) are teaching Chinese to their students. Aqaei himself has taught Chinese language at the University of Isfahan. In 2010, the head of the Islamic Propagation Office of Isfahan recognised that ‘language is highly effective in advancing the seminary’s higher objectives for propagating the true religion of Islam.’

Iran’s theocracy is working to spread its beliefs outside the traditional Shia belt (West and South Asia), into sub-Saharan Africa (Tanzania, for example) and South America (Brazil and Venezuela). For Iranian clergymen, China is not just an economic partner but a civilisational arena ripe for ideological expansion. What Aqaei and Javaheri represent is a reverse flow of religious literacy exported from Iran into the Chinese linguistic space. Their mission to promote Shia beliefs in China aligns with the Iranian state’s policy. For the Iranian religious establishment, China represents a vast untapped field of non-believers where their Shia branch of Islam can grow, and they can attract followers and project influence.

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About the Author: Rustam Ali Seerat is an independent researcher with an interest in the Middle East, South and Central Asia. He closely monitors the ongoing Sino-U.S. rivalry in the region. He can be reached at [email protected]