China’s Mega Dam in Tibet: A Technocratic Logic

On 25 December 2024, Chinese media reported that the central government had approved the construction of a mega-dam on the “great bend” of the Yarlung Zangbo River in Medog County in southeastern Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The report further stated that the project is key to China’s efforts to develop this region into a green energy hub and that a solid foundation has already been laid down. 

High on Chinese Political Agenda

Claimed to be larger than the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, the project has been in the making for nearly two decades since 2006. Meanwhile, China constructed and put into operation a few smaller-sized dams in the middle and lower reaches of Yarlung Zangbo, including the Zangmu dam, in 2014 in Gyaca county of Lhoka prefecture in TAR. Finally, the 14th Five-Year Plan (2020-2025) included the project among key ones for boosting green energy, and the central leadership had approved it in March 2021. The recent official announcement suggests that the construction will begin soon. 

The “mega dam” will be located in the “great bend” area, which will affect the river flow between Pei town (派镇) in Mainling and Beibeng township (背崩镇) in Medog, covering the whole area of the river when it takes roundabout of the Namcha Barwa mountain.

The groundwork has already been laid for the project to kick off. The local authorities in Mainling and Medog counties have undertaken intensive relocation of people in the proposed areas of dam— Beibeng and Ganden townships in Medog and Pei town in Mainling. Moreover, the location of villages and township seats have been shifted, suggesting that these relocation efforts are setting the groundwork for dam construction. 

Chinese official discourses reveal that energy projects in southwest China have been high on the political agenda in the last decade. These have to do with infrastructure development, green energy production and questions of ecological protection. The importance of the Medog dam is evident from the fact that Communist Party of China General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Nyingchi and inspected Medog county and Mainling city in 2021. Official reports suggest that he inquired about the ecological conservation of the Yarlung Zangbo River – this is a protected area and the project site falls within it. China has also invested heavily in solar and wind power projects in Chamdo, Nyingchi, and Lhoka prefectures in the southeastern parts of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Moreover, authorities have ramped up projects such as east-west energy transmission to connect green energy projects with regional and national grid systems.

Indian Context

India officially lodged its concerns with the Chinese side, underlining its rights as a lower riparian country and saying that the project would negatively impact the flow of water. The Chinese announcement has triggered diverse reactions in India ranging from the dam’s potential impact on ecology, water flow to downstream countries, and weaponization of water during conflicts between neighbors. 

The Chinese announcement came barely weeks after an agreement between India and China on resolving military tensions in eastern Ladakh after more than four years of a military standoff. Indian senior military officials have indicated there is “still a degree of standoff” while foreign minister S. Jaishankar has repeatedly emphasized that both countries are still trying to “disentangle” from the standoff, suggesting both sides will need more time and effort to bridge the trust gap created as a result of tensions on the border.

The initial Chinese official response to Indian concerns signal both indifference, and a degree of disingenuousness. On 6 January, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the dam would not affect the flow of water to downstream countries and played down its geopolitical implications. The indifferent response is in contrast to its approach on previous occasions. In response to India’s concerns regarding the Zhagmu dam, so far, the largest on the Yarlung Zangbo, in the early 2010s, China assured India through political and diplomatic channels that Zangmu dam was smaller in size and will not impact water flow.

With the deteriorating relationship with India, China has shown a propensity to violate agreements on water sharing, as happened during the Doklam standoff when it stopped sharing hydrological data. Therefore, this time around, China’s cold shoulder to Indian concerns underlines a potential shift in China’s approach to the issues related to transboundary water sharing. The disingenuousness is evident in multiple claims that a senior Chinese embassy official in India makes in an op-ed for a major Indian newspaper. For instance, he claims that “China does not and will never seek ‘water hegemony’” and promptly gives the example of its interactions with the Mekong delta countries. But the fact is that China has indeed, acted hegemonically with its large-scale construction of dams on the upper reaches of the Mekong (called Lancang in China) – such dam-building has led to floods and drought in lower riparian countries. Similarly, the claim that “China has repeatedly provided hydrological data to India during emergencies, and strongly supported it in disaster prevention and reduction measures” has not been true in practice. 

Specifically, India’s criticism of China’s dam projects on the Yarlung Zangbo River attracts international attention to the latter’s belligerent behaviour and, more significantly, to the issue of Tibet – a sensitive issue for the Chinese government in its international relations. Consequently, Beijing is unlikely to share key data about the dam and its impact on water flow with India, which will further deepen the mistrust between the two sides, and the window of opportunity for cooperation on the issue is narrower than in the past.

China’s Technocratic Vision

Why is China pushing for dams and other large-scale infrastructure in ecologically sensitive areas? Worldwide, there has been a shift from building large-scale dams to smaller ones, marking a paradigm shift during the first two decades of the 21st century. However, not only China but all Himalayan states have also resorted to building large dams. While geopolitical competition to control water are significant factors, what drives China’s mission-mode approach to develop large dams on the Yarlung Zangbo and Southwestern China is its urge to satisfy green energy needs through exploiting hydro, wind, and solar resources in ecologically fragile region with large ethnic populations. 

In this drive, Chinese policymakers’ highly technocratic vision disregard the socio-economic consequences of dams for the ethnic population as well as their ecological impact on lower riparian countries like India and Bangladesh. In China’s political ecosystem, “scientific methods” legitimize its policies ideologically and justify brushing aside any opposition. The reliance on science, however faulty it might be, explains state interventions in ecological conservation in Xi Jinping’s tenure. As the official spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, the “decision to build the project was made after rigorous scientific evaluation,” and hence, from Chinese perspective, no question arises for any negative impact. 

Past experiences, however, contradict Chinese statements. While all states must work together to avert potential ecological crises due to intense state developmental interventions in fragile ecosystems, China’s approaches based on firm ideological belief in technology is a major hinderance any meaningful cooperation.

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About the Authors:
Devendra Kumar, PhD, is an Associate Fellow at the Center of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.

Sangay Lachenpa, PhD, is Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.