Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012, when Xi Jinping took over as General Secretary, discipline inspection and supervisory organs across the country have filed 8.105 million cases and punished 7.922 million officials.[1] Contrast this with the situation in India where even if it were the claim that the problem does not exist at the scale it exists in China, it should still be concerning that consolidated figures are not issued by the government and that available figures are scattered across multiple sources.
However, the real significance of China’s long-running anti-corruption campaign is in the sustained targeting of the ‘tigers’, or Party officials in senior ranks. Of the millions punished, 963 are “officials registered at and supervised by the CPC Central Committee’, which is to say that very senior officials including Central Committee (CC) members, too.
Each Party Congress elects a CC of approximately 200 full members and 170-odd alternate members. The full members choose the Politburo of about 25 members from within their ranks and it is from the Politburo that the Standing Committee including General Secretary are chosen. In other words, the full CC members are the 200 most powerful people in China, comprising party secretaries (equivalent to Indian chief ministers) and governors of provinces, central government ministers, military leaders at the theatre command level and heads of Central Military Commission (CMC) departments, heads of the party organizations that report directly to the CC – such as for example, the Communist Youth League – and heads of national-level organizations such as the All China Women’s Federation, All China Federation of Trade Unions and state-owned enterprises. The alternates, meanwhile, occupy junior ranks and constitute leaders-in-waiting.
By the end of the 5th Plenum of the 20th CC, a total of 51 members – full and alternate had been expelled – an unprecedented number in the post-Mao period. At the end of the 18th and 19th CCs, the numbers were respectively 49 and 12. In other words, approximately an eighth of the 20th CC membership has been removed before the full term concluded. It is against this backdrop that the 5th Plenum issued its communique, “Resolution on Certain Major Issues concerning Persevering with Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance.”[2]
What are the implications for China and the rest of the world of this stringent CPC approach to ‘self-governance’?
To start with the Communique declares that the Party “has secured progress” in among other things, “balancing domestic and international imperatives; ensuring both development and security; delivering tangible results in high-quality economic development… safeguarding national security and social stability… modernizing national defense and the armed forces; carrying out work related to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; and pursuing major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.”
In other words, the domestic and the external are closely tied. In this respect, one of the first things that impacts the rest of the world is China’s economic policymaking. Like other aspects of policymaking, this too, is increasingly top-down and centralized. Xi Jinping seeks to shape local economic policies and their implementation through the appointment of officials who are not just competent economic administrators – a large number of new appointees to the positions of governor and vice-governor in provinces have backgrounds in economics and finance – but also hew to his political agenda of firm Party control over the economy.
However, just like the Party cannot will Chinese families to produce more children, it is unlikely it can will them into parting with their savings to boost domestic consumption – the lack of which is a fundamental weakness of the Chinese economy. In external economic policy, meanwhile, Party control does not necessarily translate into good Chinese economic behaviour. The Party has noted that “safeguarding … [China’s] development interests” has become “even more arduous”. This is a recipe for greater pressure both on Chinese enterprises engaged abroad and on foreign enterprises doing business in or with China.
The other important aspect of China’s external policy affected is its security policies. The CMC was reduced to just two members since January this year and the sole vice-chairman Gen. Zhang Shengmin has now been promoted to the Politburo. Zhang is a political commissar with a focus on anti-corruption work, not a battlefield commander. While this does indicate greater politicization of the PLA, it does not simultaneously mean that war-fighting is not a priority. If anything, it suggests the opposite – that Chinese military modernization and expansion is so far advanced that it requires greater political oversight over decision-making within the PLA so that political goals and the military means to achieve them are better aligned. China’s neighbours will have much to worry about.
A decade-long anti-corruption campaign and one that continues with ever-increasing intensity raises several questions, especially when even those considered close to Xi have also fallen. However, the 5th Plenum Communique declares, “deep-seated problems that had plagued the Party for years have been remedied, and serious dangers hidden within the Party, the state, and the military have been removed.” Xi is clearly making a case for his continuance in power for a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress at the end of next year. His political strategy as evident in the Plenum Communique is of shaping the next generation of the Party’s leadership while pre-empting any potential opposition to his political agenda.
Originally Published as Jabin T Jacob and Devendra Kumar. 2026. ‘The Communist Party with Xi Jinping Characteristics’, The Indian Express, 3 November 2026. Published online as ‘Fifth CPC plenum shows, in Xi Jinping’s China, no tiger is too big to fall’.
[1]https://en.people.cn/n3/2026/1030/c90000-20514084.html
[2]https://english.news.cn/20261029/965f79ff909443e69b988dbf0ea46245/c.html