Rhetoric Without Commitment: China Promotes its Interests in US-Iran Conflict

On 16 September, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing. The Chinese readout of their talks noted Beijing was “ready to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Iran to safeguard Iran’s legitimate rights and interests”. Beijing’s call for Iran and the US to “return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding as soon as possible”, and for support for Iran in conducting dialogue with Gulf countries, indicated greater alignment with Tehran, which has shown a willingness to return to the June agreement than with Washington, which expects Beijing to use its leverage with Tehran to change Iran’s security posture and regional behaviour. The US-Israel war with Iran has led to greater consensus in Iran’s fractious politics on strengthening ties with China. Even so, Tehran will need to reassess its expectations as Beijing seeks to balance its support for Iran with broader economic interests and other partnerships across the region.

The timing of Araghchi’s visit was especially significant for Iran’s diplomatic position amid intensive military and economic pressure from the US. Over the last two weeks, Iranian leadership saw participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the BRICS+ Summit in India as an important opportunity to mobilise diplomatic support for Iran. However, the absence of an official bilateral meeting between Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian and Chinese President Xi Jinping, despite two back-to-back opportunities, led to alarmist interpretations in Tehran’s policy circles about the uncertain future of Iran-China relations. A leading politician from the reformist faction, which has traditionally sought diplomacy and détente with the West, publicly argued that Beijing had set specific ‘preconditions’, including opening the Strait of Hormuz, for accepting a visit by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who was appointed a special envoy to deepen ties with China. Furthermore, Araghchi’s visit to Beijing, like the previous one in May 2026 when Trump visited China, precedes the Trump-Xi summit in Washington DC on 24 September.

Beijing has so far not yielded to US persuasion to use its influence with Tehran to force Iran to change its policies amid the US-Iran confrontation. However, it will seek to balance its support for Iran against US unilateralism and its rival security vision in West Asia without jeopardising recent stability in the US-China relationship.

As the US escalated economic and military pressure on Iran after withdrawing from the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018, and again in the wake of the Hamas-Israel war, Iran and its non-state actor allies have responded with asymmetric strategies to disrupt energy flows and commerce through crucial waterways and maritime chokepoints in West Asia. US officials have argued that China, with its substantial economic interests in West Asia and nearly half of its crude imports sourced from the region, should stop ‘free-riding’ on the US security presence and work alongside Washington as part of the solution. In January 2024, reports emerged that the Biden administration had repeatedly sought Beijing’s help to urge Iran to stop the Iranian-aligned Houthis in Yemen from attacking Red Sea trade routes since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023. Similarly, in the lead-up to the Trump-Xi summit in China in May earlier this year, Washington sought Beijing’s support for a resolution sponsored by the US’ Gulf allies, calling on Iran to cease all attacks and threats against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and on UN efforts to establish a humanitarian corridor in the waterway, which Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards had closed following the US-Israel attack on the country.

However, in recent years, China has framed its approach towards Iran and the region through the lens of strategic competition with the US and its broader diplomatic goals of positioning itself as a ‘constructive’ and ‘major country’ with a role in issues of international peace and security. As Iran and its non-state allies like the Houthis undermine the US-led security architecture, China is advancing its alternative vision of regional security that dovetails with Iran’s view of the US military presence as the greatest threat to regional stability.

In May 2026, just days after the US and Iran agreed to a ceasefire, Chinese President Xi Jinping, in a meeting with Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, in Beijing, articulated his “four-point plan on a new security architecture for the Middle East”. It reiterates Beijing’s alternative vision for region-led and common security, rejecting external interference and upholding respect for national sovereignty and international law. Xi raised the four-point proposal again during his visit to Egypt in the first week of September.

China is certainly not going to join the US expanded sanctions campaign against Iran. However, it may be inclined to use its leverage with Iran and its broader regional influence to give momentum to regional efforts to restore transit through the Strait of Hormuz and prevent further escalation amid recent advances by Houthis on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Notably, Wang Yi told Araghchi that “China does not wish to see regional tensions further spill over into Yemen and the Red Sea.” Tehran may see the Chinese President’s remarks in Cairo that governance and security of the Red Sea remain the primary responsibility of its littoral states as support for a joint Iranian-Omani management regime in the Strait of Hormuz, especially if it is accepted by regional countries. At the same time, Iran will be wary of Chinese backing for Saudi-led efforts to mobilise a coalition for Red Sea maritime security, alongside Egypt, Somalia, and others.

The strategic failure of the US-Israel war with Iran has undermined the US-led security architecture in the region, leading to prolonged uncertainty and insecurity. Beijing now has to manage the expectations of Iran and US allies, which have burgeoning economic ties with China and seek Beijing’s involvement in regional security issues. Only time will tell if Beijing is ready to go beyond rhetoric and invest capital in advancing a new architecture in West Asia as the old order crumbles. 

About the Author: Deepika Saraswat is Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.