"Condorcet - Winning Public Information in Oligopolistic Markets" by Dr. Jaideep Roy

Event Date: 
Thursday, August 9, 2018 -

Can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from Condorcet cycles? In an oligopolistic market where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity or price decisions, we show that the majoritarian preference for the precision of public information is well-defined for consumers. For fairly general demand functions, we then characterize the Condorcet-winning precision of public information for consumers.  We report conditions on the demand function, the number of firms, and the mode of competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) under which the Condorcet-winning precision of public information for consumers (i) hurts consumers' surplus, profits or both, or (ii) remains conflict-free.  

Thursday 09, Aug 2018
03:30 PM - 04:45 PM