China’s “Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress” and Implications for the Tibetans
On July 1, 2026, China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress took effect. The law aims to promote a common national identity among ethnic groups in China. While the official discourses frame it as a key step in China’s drive towards the goals of modernization by 2035, neither ideological language nor policy prescriptions are new. Rather, the purpose of the law is to codify policy changes and ideological focus underway since 2016. In particular, the law [Article 1] emphasizes “forging a strong sense of the community of the Chinese people” as the key overarching goal. The term “forging” (zhulao, 铸牢) underlines the assimilationist turn aggressively pursued under Xi Jinping’s rule.
Moreover, the law mandates Communist Party and state institutions, families and parents, and educational institutions and media to incorporate ethnic assimilation in their daily operations and activities. This mandate extends responsibility to the whole Party-state and society and marks a gradual but decisive shift in the legal responsibility of individuals, families, and institutions.
Although the Constitution of China and the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law have provisions to accommodate safeguards and protections for minority groups, there have been gaps in their operation and implementation. In reality, for the Chinese government, “safeguarding state unity” precedes the exercise of autonomy by minority groups. Despite the legal instruments meant for safeguarding ethnic minorities, several reports have emerged regarding the human rights violations of ethnic minorities carried out by the Chinese Party-state.
According to a Human Rights Watch , Chinese authorities “arbitrarily detain human rights defenders, tightly control civil society, media, and the internet, and deploy invasive mass surveillance technology.” Another report by the US Department of State notes, violations of human rights include incidents of torture, arbitrary detention, restrictions on freedom of expression and religious freedom, and transnational repression. Yet another report highlights how China has been aiming at “coercive transformation” of Tibet under the guise of “economic progress.” The same report stated China’s attempt to erase Tibetan heritage by targeting monasteries and Tibetan schools. Recently, a report by Tibet Watch raised concerns over the detention of a Tibetan Buddhist monk, Jamyang Tashi, under unknown charges. It is feared that Jamyang could be subjected to a clandestine trial, as in the case of many Tibetans in the past. There are other reports about how the Chinese government has been replacing minority languages in schools with Mandarin for more than a decade, which has been “eroding the Tibetan language and culture.”
Considering the history of significant acts of direct and intended human rights violations by the Chinese authorities in Tibet and other ethnic minority regions, the implications of the new ethnic law, which aims at national unity, for ethnic minority regions could be significant. The repressions in the ethnic minority regions of China are no longer through the conspicuous use of bombs but via “deceptive policies and laws.” As such, human rights activists are sceptical about the new ethnic law, which could erase minority languages and erode ethnic identities as it mandates Mandarin Chinese as the primary language for government agencies and schools.
Previously, China implemented the 2015 National Security Law, which prohibited separatism and other activities that could threaten national unity. The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress builds on the Security Law but differs from it in that it “bolsters the legal basis for ethnic unity.”
Another noteworthy shift is its transnational application to target individuals and entities outside Chinese jurisdiction whose words or actions, in the eyes of Chinese authorities, do not align with their perspectives. Article 63 of the ethnic law extends China’s legal reach beyond its borders. The Article states:
Organizations and individuals outside the [mainland] territory of the P.R.C. that commit acts aimed at the P.R.C. that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law.
The provision would allow Chinese authorities to apply elements of the law beyond its sovereign territory. The law, therefore, adds to the increasing number of domestic laws on national security, intelligence, foreign and other laws under the “foreign-related rule of law” with transnational reach. It could also threaten freedom and rule of law in democratic nations, adding to increasing instances of transnational repression. The law’s provisions can be weaponised by China, posing a threat to activists abroad whose families are in China, and it could limit their possibilities of safely returning to China.
Ethnic minorities in China strive to preserve their language and culture in small but significant ways. For example, some Tibetans are displaying everyday resistance against China’s assimilationist practices by learning the Tibetan script, practicing Buddhist rituals, or preserving traditional Tibetan weaving.
In other parts of the world, Tibetan exiles are protesting against the law by holding rallies and demonstrations, observing hunger strikes, and adopting other unique ways. In an extreme case of protest, a Tibetan individual, Lobga Rangzen, self-immolated himself in front of the United Nations Headquarters in New York a day after the Ethnic Unity Law came into force. These protests, and especially Rangzen’s sacrifice, remind the world of the continued struggle of the Tibetans against what they claim is China’s occupation of Tibet and to protect their unique culture, language, and religion from being gradually eroded.
About the Author: Dr Amrita Saikia is an Assistant Professor, School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, Woxsen University, Hyderabad